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T

he place of m
 usic in nineteenth-century poetry and fiction has garnered
much interest in recent criticism and has stimulated innovative work on
the idea of m
 usic in nineteenth-century British literature, including the politi
cal, class, and gendered implications of music in fiction and poetry; yet the
crucial fact that music provided poetry with a philosophic language is given
less attention than it merits.1 Felicia Bonaparte argues that its philosophical
significance is often missed b ecause twentieth-and twenty-first-century thought
has inherited an empirical concept of music. This is distinct from the Victorian idea of m
 usic that was influenced by German Romantic theory.2 While
the predominant eighteenth-century empirical view of m
 usic argued that
instrumental music was capable of stimulating the physical emotions but was
unable to convey ideas, German Romantic writers such as Wilhelm Heinrich
Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), the Schlegel b rothers, E. T. A Hoffman, Arthur Schopenhauer, and later Richard Wagner maintained that it was precisely its unmediated quality that allowed music
 usic
to access Platonic ideas that transcend the sensory realm.3 Believing that m
facilitated a perception of the ideal, the German Romantics conceived of m
 usic
not only as a progression of numerical notes but as way to apprehend universal
and transcendent ideas that could not be known through the intellect. It was
this correlation between music and philosophy that gave music its crucial place
in discussions of art and epistemology in the nineteenth century.4
That Robert Browning shared the Romantic view of music as the most
transcendent of all the arts is well attested in criticism of his life and poetry,
as is his virtuosity as a musician;5 yet despite insightful critical commentary
elicited by his music monologues, the fact that Browning utilizes the German
Romantic theory of music as a way to discuss epistemological issues has been
largely overlooked.6 Browning refers to m
 usic hundreds of times in his poetry,
and he refers to song many more times again; yet because these many allusions
are often only glimpsed in single lines and briefly recurring metaphors, their
471
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philosophical significance can easily be missed. Despite the widely held notion
that Browning espoused an essentially Romantic view of music, many of the
critical assumptions about Browning’s music poems are derived from an empirical concept of music; therefore, a philosophical paradigm shift is needed in
order to see how Browning relies on the idealist view of m
 usic to provide his
reader with an interpretive key for the complex epistemological questions that
he raises throughout his poetry. To uncover this alternative philosophical
framework, I examine Browning’s self-proclaimed affinity with the German
idealist philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, b ecause an attention to the similarities that Browning found in his foundational philosophical premises reveals how music has a central symbolic significance in the poems that explicitly
discuss music and also in important philosophical poems, such as La Saisiaz,
that have not previously been associated with music philosophy.
The German Romantic idea that m
 usic precedes the notes that bring it
forth is an enduring metaphor in Browning’s poetry for two different faculties
of knowledge, which he refers to as “fancy” and “fact,” or reason. While fancy
intuits the transcendent ideas expressed by music, the faculty of reason, the
logical processes of the mind that make judgments based on sense experience,
can only perceive the external numerical form of m
 usic. Romantic music philosophy also provides Browning with a symbolic language through which to
express his theory of the objective poet. Browning’s conception of the objective poet, and its development in the dramatic monologue form, has typically
been seen as a rejection of Romantic epistemology; yet the relationship between the inner realm of m
 usic and the outward expression of sound is symbolic for Browning of the connection between an ideal substrate and its
manifestation in the real world and also of the connection between the idealism of the subjective poet and the realism of the objective poet. The m
 usic
monologues “Master Hugues of Saxe Gotha,” “A Toccata of Galuppi’s,” and
“Abt Vogler” are an important explication of this use of symbolism as they
focus on the tension between the empirical view of m
 usic as form and the
Romantic view of m
 usic as philosophy in order to express the relationship of
fancy to reason and of the ideal to the real.
The Romantic philosophy of music expounded by Tieck, Wackenroder,
and the Schlegel b rothers finds its most comprehensive exposition in Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation. Critics have variously promoted or denied the significance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy for Browning’s
poetry: Leslie White explores the similarity between Schopenhauer’s concept
of will and Browning’s faith in human intuition as it is expressed in his early
poetry, yet Apryl Lea Denny Heath refutes William Lyon Phelps’s suggestion
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that Schopenhauer may have influenced Browning’s music monologues because
she finds Schopenhauer’s concept of m
 usic to be entirely incompatible with
Browning’s emphasis on the material world, an issue to which I will return in
due course.7 It is clear, however, that Phelps is absolutely justified in perceiving
the arresting similarities between Schopenhauer and Browning since Browning recognized them himself. After reading a biography of Schopenhauer given
to him in 1876, Browning wrote to Mrs. Ernest Benzon to describe the affinity
that he had found between himself and the German philosopher:
I gain an adequate notion of Schopenhauer and what he accounts his
grand discovery. So much of it as I acknowledge for truth as I have believed
in them from my earliest youth, . . . the distinction and pre-eminence of
the Soul from and over the intelligence—“Soul” in the evident sense
of Schopenhauer’s “Will”—And the fact was at once so realized by me,
that I am sure it must show through my writings, here and there as their
substratum.8
Browning states that his foundational convictions regarding soul and
mind derive from the same epistemological foundation as Schopenhauer’s philosophy and that this shared ground constitutes the “substratum” of his own
poetic works. This substratum, I argue, is that of philosophical idealism. The
critical consensus has been, in its different forms, that Browning’s concept of
the objective poet is a repudiation of the absolutes sought by the subjective
poet—an idea that would also appear at odds with the transcendental foundations of German idealism; yet in The Lucid Veil, W. David Shaw demonstrates
the pervasive impact that idealist philosophy had on Victorian poets, especially Browning.9 While Shaw focuses on the compelling correlations between
Browning and Hegel, Clyde de L. Ryals and Patricia Dianne Rigg, two critics
who have written on Browning and German philosophy, both analyze Browning’s poetics within the context of Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of irony;10 however, it is the point of connection between Schopenhauer and Browning on
which I focus in this essay because this particular relationship illuminates how
Browning utilizes Romantic music philosophy to symbolize key epistemological
issues in his poetry and to express the idealist foundation of his poetic theory.11
Schopenhauer argues in The World as Will and Representation that there
are two aspects to the world—the world of representation and the will—each
aspect being dependent on and inseparable from the other.12 The world of
representation is the objective material world of phenomena as they exist in
space and time; it is the world of empirical perception and is the manifestation
of the other aspect of the world, which is the w
 ill. The will is the realm of the
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subject and exists entirely outside of time and space, and Schopenhauer explains that his idea of the w
 ill is analogous to Immanuel Kant’s concept of the
noumenal: it is “the being-in-itself of e very thing in the world, and is the sole
kernel of every phenomenon” (p. 118). The will is a universal substrate, encompassing and comprising the essences of the entire world; as opposed to
the mere representation or semblance of a phenomenon, the will is the
thing-in-itself.
In contrast to the groundless world of will, Schopenhauer says that the
faculty of the understanding perceives the laws of cause and effect that govern
the world of representation. The senses supply the understanding with data
from the material world that is then passed into the reflective consciousness of
the reason. Schopenhauer combines t hese branches of knowledge—sense, understanding, and reason—into what he calls the principle of sufficient reason,
which may be understood as defining the processes of conceptual thought;
however, Schopenhauer argues that the understanding can never reveal the
inner nature or will of things because, in perceiving only the world of cause
and effect, it is confined to showing “mere connexions, relations, of one repre
sentation to another, form without any content” (p. 121). It is Schopenhauer’s
conviction that the will as thing-in-itself cannot be subject to direct investigation b ecause it is not the object of knowledge: the faculty of understanding
can never penetrate past the phenomenal and into the noumenal, or the inner
essence of things. Although Schopenhauer aligns himself with Kant in maintaining the impossibility of accessing the noumenal, he distinguishes himself
in asserting that, although the intellect can only know the how and not the
what of phenomena, we can search for the inner meaning of things through
the true inverse of rational knowledge—the intuition of the imagination and
of feeling, which allows us to know the noumenal aspect of the world.
Browning explicitly aligns his concept of soul with Schopenhauer’s w
 ill
and reveals the striking similarity of German idealism to his foundational epistemology: for Browning, soul is not only a theological concept but also the
noumenal realm of existence made manifest in the world and in humankind.
In “Charles Avison,” Browning avers the difficulty of defining soul and seeks
to compare it against mind, which he sees as corresponding to Schopenhauer’s
principle of sufficient reason.13 Imagining his reader asking for “an illustrative
image” (l. 150), Browning uses architectural imagery to connote the processes
of the mind and help define what he means by “soul.” Browning visualizes the
mind as a worker who seeks to “o’erarch a gulf” (l. 153) and who, in using facts,
assesses, connects, assimilates, and builds in order to construct knowledge: “he
digs, transports / Shapes and, through enginery—all sizes, sorts, / Lays stone
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by stone u ntil a floor compact / Proves our bridged causeway” (ll. 153–156).
The mind derives knowledge from data that is taken from the senses: “So
worked Mind: its tribe / Of senses ministrant above, below, / Far, near, or now
or haply long ago / Brought to pass knowledge” (ll. 175–178). While the precision of these varied movements of the mind are “easy, even, to descry, describe” (l. 174), Browning says that soul is “An element which works beyond
our guess” (l. 160). Belonging to the noumenal realm, the soul lies beyond the
reach of the mind.
A formless voice that comes from within and undulates under the mind,
soul is the “unsounded sea—whose lift of surge / Spite of all superstructure” of
the mind, “lets emerge, / In flower and foam, Feeling from out the deeps” (ll.
161–163). It is important to remember that here Browning means “feeling” not
in its empirical sense but, in accordance with Schopenhauer, as a profound
intuition of the noumenal substrate of material reality. Although Browning
proclaims the ineffable nature of soul—the will-in-itself—he asserts that ultimately it seeks to find form in the world:
Yet wherefore heaving sway and restless roll
This side and that, except to emulate
Stability above? To match and mate
Feeling with knowledge,—make as manifest
Soul’s work as Mind’s work . . . (ll. 183–187)
Along with employing metaphors of the ocean’s surface and depth to show
how soul endeavors to embody itself in forms of the material world, Browning
also describes the process of manifestation in metallurgical terms: “run
mercury into a mould like lead” (l. 192) and “shoot / Liquidity into a mould”
(ll. 209–210). Soul seeks to manifest itself in the empirical world, its groundless
viscosity seeking material encasement, just as Schopenhauer’s will is embodied
in the world of representation.
It is this material realization of soul that is the “prize” and “puzzle” of art
(l. 195), and Browning asks the same question that was posed, and answered,
by the Romantic generation before him: “Does Mind get Knowledge from Art’s
ministry?” (l. 200). Schopenhauer argues that the mind does indeed derive
knowledge from art because art is able to objectify or represent the will by
means of the Platonic ideas. T
 hese ideas are the highest objectification of the
will b ecause they deal in essences rather than in particulars; they do not take
on a form particular to knowledge but rather precede all knowledge. All of the
arts endeavor to represent the eternal Platonic ideas, just as the ideas are an
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objectification of the will; therefore, Schopenhauer says that art can be defined “as the way of considering things independently of the principle of sufficient
reason” (p. 185). Thus, through bypassing the principle of sufficient reason, it is
possible to grasp the ideas that are embodied in art.
As the representation of the Platonic ideas, art is a copy of a copy that
offers only an indirect route to the will. However, for Schopenhauer, music
stands apart from all of the other arts in its unmediated power to express the
innermost being of the world and of our own selves. According to Schopenhauer, this transcendent quality of music suggests that we must look beyond
the aesthetic experience of music as merely the effect on our perception of
music’s empirical and external form—the sound that is the progression of notes
over time—and that these “numerical ratios into which it [music] can be resolved
are related not as the thing signified, but only as the sign” (p. 256). Schopenhauer
explains that music, unlike the other arts, is not mediated through concepts,
and in bypassing the understanding, it speaks a language that is intelligible to
all. Music always reveals the inner nature of e very phenomenon and “gives
the innermost kernel preceding all form, or the heart of things” (p. 263). As the
most immediate expression of feeling, music is not a copy of the ideas but a
copy of the will itself; therefore, “music does not express this or that particular
and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace
of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature”
(p. 261). Music directly expresses the essence of noumenal truth.
Browning too believes that the mind can receive knowledge from art’s
ministry because art apprehends eternal truths. Through art, “What’s known
once is known ever” (l. 201). Yet, as with Schopenhauer, Browning views art as
belonging to the world of representation. Indeed, Browning uses the same meta
phor of building, gathering, and assembling to depict the artistic process that
he utilizes to delineate the workings of mind: “Arts arrange, / Dissociate, re-
distribute, interchange / Part with part, lengthen, broaden, high or deep /
Construct their bravest” (ll. 201–204). It is only through enhancing these
structural maneuverings that the artist can reveal more clearly the idea concealed
beneath them: “what lay loose / At first lies firmly a fter, what design / Was faintly
traced in hesitating line / Once on a time, grows firmly resolute / Henceforth
and evermore” (ll. 205–209). Despite the fact that art’s ministry endeavors to
represent eternal ideas, its processes are still implicated in the processes of
reason because they are mediated.
Each art form seeks to “stay the apparition” (l. 218) and may succeed in
this to varying degrees, but music surpasses the other art forms in its capacity
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to express truth: “There is no truer truth obtainable / By Man than comes of
music” (ll. 138–139). Browning declares about m
 usic, “Dredging deeper yet /
Drag into day,—by sound, thy master-net,—/ The abysmal bottom-growth,
ambiguous t hing / Unbroken of a branch, palpitating / With limbs’ play and
life’s semblance!” (ll. 235–239). Music expresses soul, whereas sound is music’s
form that has been manifested into a progression of notes. The Romantic idea
that m
 usic precedes sound is crucial for the way in which Browning utilizes
the symbol of music in his poetry: music plunges into the depths of soul, and
sound is the “master-net” that works to bring it forth into day. Browning also
draws on the metaphor of night and day, where night is the realm of noumenal
truth and day is the realm of manifestation—a metaphor that was popularized
by Novalis in his Hymns to the Night—to emphasize that sound embodies the
music of the “unsounded sea” that is soul (l. 161).14
For Browning, although transcendent ideas are eternal, their material
embodiments are inevitably subject to material changes. He explores this subject in “Charles Avison” by pondering the temporal transformations in musical fashion: when Browning asks how it is that Avison’s outdated music can
still be a perfect expression of soul and yet how Wagner’s new music can be
equally as true, he is not conceding that all music is subjective, as Marc Plamondon suggests,15 but rather that new musical styles are different embodiments of eternal ideas—they are the forms that freshly embody universal
emotions so that they can be perceived from the temporal side of the world.
Note how it is that the ideas wait “Till Music loose them, fit each filmily /
With form enough to know and name it by” (ll. 261–262): ideas persist yet are
only known when a fit form is periodically found. Browning returns to the
German Romantic metaphor of night and day to denote this manifestation:
“Nor to such appeal / Is M
 usic long obdurate: off they steal—/ How g ently,
dawn-doomed phantoms! back come they / Full-blooded with new crimson of
broad day—/ Passion made palpable once more” (ll. 265–269). Thus, although
the musical expression of soul is indeed transitory, Browning shares Schopenhauer’s conviction that if it could be fixed, m
 usic would completely transmit
the transcendent substrate of the world.
The full implication of music for Browning’s foundational epistemology
is articulated in La Saisiaz (1878), a highly personal poem in which Browning
professes to look for answers to metaphysical questions from within the scope
of reason.16 La Saisiaz has not yet been analyzed for its discussion of music, but
this discussion is in fact the symbolic key that Browning provides for our
interpretation of the poem. Written a fter the shockingly sudden death of
his good friend Miss A. Egerton-Smith, Browning begins his inquiry into
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metaphysics by presenting two ontological conditions of knowledge: that God
exists and that the soul is eternal; however; he admits at the start that he cannot fully impart this knowledge to the reader of his poem. Turning first to the
idea of music, he attests the futility of speech’s aim to express truth: “I shall no
more dare to mimic such response in futile speech, / Pass off h
 uman lisp as
echo of the sphere-song out of reach” (ll. 153–154). Browning later compares
the futility of fully translating divine music into human speech to an impossible attempt to extrapolate the sound of a roaring avalanche from the sound
of a single clump of earth thrown to the ground. H
 uman speech is unavailing
for Browning because it is implicated in conceptual cognition and thus cannot access the noumenal “sphere-song out of reach.” Donald Hair has explored
in detail the similarity of Browning’s conception of speech to John Locke’s
understanding that the connection between the sign and the signified is entirely arbitrary;17 however, while it is true that Browning avers the ontological
separation of the sign and the signified, it is important to note that he juxtaposes language with music, as he does so many times in his poetry, in order to
show that the divine totality (represented by m
 usic) is made manifest in the
laws of succession and plurality (represented by speech).
Although Browning confirms that he cannot speak of the divine sphere
in human language, he also proclaims that knowledge outside of the empirical
scope of reason is indeed possible through fancy. It is easy to misunderstand
what Browning means by this term; although “fancy” for Coleridge designates
the empirical conception of the associative imagination, Browning uses the
term “fancy,” like Dickens, to refer to Shelley’s concept of imagination, the
faculty that accesses objective truth. “Fancy” for Browning is not the empirical associative imagination but rather the imaginative faculty that perceives
the essences that are inexplicable to the principle of sufficient reason. However, Hair assumes that Browning’s notion of fancy, along with his understanding of language, is Lockean and defines it in its empirical sense as “something
made up in the mind, something which does not correspond to the relations
we actually observe outside us” (p. 265). This leads Hair to conclude that Browning’s Lockean theory of language results in his emphasis on the necessity of
reason, which despite the relativity of language can still make a judgment and
thereby infer a probable relation between name and idea (p. 261).
Yet fancy and fact are ontologically linked for Browning: while fancy is
the faculty that apprehends soul, fact comprises soul’s manifestation in the
empirical laws that condition our perception of the material world. Browning
also states that fancy circumvents the conditioned realm of fact and thus has
access to the initial cause and of the ultimate effect: “Fact it is I know I know
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not something which is fact as much. / What before caused all the c auses,
what effect of all effects / Haply follows,—these are fancy” (ll. 224–226). Browning expresses this more simply in “Gerard de Lairesse” (“Parleyings,” CW, 16:
95–111), when he asserts that fancy deals with “fact unseen but no less fact the
same” (l. 152) or, in other words, with facts that the senses cannot see and that
reason cannot discern.
Although fancy for Browning apprehends immaterial truth, in grieving
for his recently deceased friend in La Saisiaz, he longs for more tangible proof
of the soul’s afterlife. Thus, in trying to know rationally what he has perceived
through fancy, Browning places his argument within the scope of reason, which
interacts with the facts of the material world: it is a deliberate exercise that exerts “Sense and thought on fact, and then, from fact educing fit surmise” (l. 522).
Within the realm of mind, Browning entertains a series of conjectures—that
God seems good and wise or that hope for the afterlife proves the existence of
the afterlife—and follows their logical implications; yet the weakness of these
conjectures, as Browning sees it, is that they engage in circular reasoning, since
the proof of such a surmise can only be sought in its own premise.
Browning continues to explore these suppositions, what he terms “conjecture styled belief,” (l. 233) by conditionally positing the complete subjectivity of all experience, which is the necessary end point of empirical philosophy.
Browning notes that subjectivity is an idea that “loomed immense to fancy”
(l. 296)—because in apprehending the wide scope of objective truth, fancy
cannot sustain the notion that truth is subjective and particular to every
individual—but he explains that subjectivity is far more palatable to reason.
Through calculation and the balancing of data, reason can “postulate omnipotence” (l. 294) and deduce a moral judgment; yet Browning observes that if
fancy (the pursuit of objective truth) were attempted through fact (knowledge
that is only derived from sensory experience), the results would be fruitless
because of their bounded nature.
In a brief, yet crucial, part of the poem that has been overlooked, Browning turns again to m
 usic to symbolize the realm of soul that cannot be discerned through the principle of sufficient reason. Taking a rest from logic, his
“brain o’erloaded” (l. 380), Browning passionately asks w
 hether he has forgotten “the open vast where soon or late converged / Ways through winding?—
world-wide heaven-high sea where m
 usic slept or surged / As the angel had
ascendant, and Beethoven’s Titan mace / Smote the immense to storm Mozart
would by a finger’s lifting chase?” (ll. 381–384). Music precedes the sound that
brings it forth: m
 usic sleeps until it is stirred up by Beethoven’s divine genius,
his “Titan mace,” and is pursued by Mozart’s dexterous touch. Here Browning
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utilizes the same language as E. T. A. Hoffmann, who proclaimed in his famous
1810 “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony” that Beethoven’s music enables
the listener to transcend the senses and to be transported directly to the infinite
realm.18 The night-realm of m
 usic is the space of the noumenal, and the compressed alliteration within “world-wide heaven-high sea” holds together the oppositional axes of heaven and earth to denote how music, as the expression of
the ideal, encompasses all of existence. At this critical moment in the poem, it
is the symbol of music that alerts the reader to an epistemological turning point
and to a level of perception that transcends Browning’s recourse to reason.19
Browning continues to allude to this unspoken element through the connection that he makes between music and silence. Browning’s cry of “Silence!”
(l. 390) appears to check the skeptical conclusions that have thus far ensued
from his suppositions about faith, but it also serves a far subtler and more
important symbolic meaning. Since one half of a duality has no existence without the other, silence actually presupposes sound’s perpetual presence; it is not
the absence of sound but the deafening and imperceptibly potential presence
of sound. Since both silence and music express noumenal truth, they precede
the temporal iterations of sound; therefore, the two terms are equated in
Romantic music philosophy. It is this ontological equality of music and silence
that provides an explanation for why Wagner exclaimed that Beethoven first
heard m
 usic after becoming deaf.20
Browning contrasts his concept of silence with that of muteness to distinguish between fancy and reason. In contrast to silence, muteness is a linear,
temporal event during which sound is truly switched off; it belongs to the
realm of phenomena, co-occurring with, rather than preceding, sound. Therefore, when Browning’s conjectures have to grapple with “Fact’s inexorable ruling ‘Outside fact, surmise be mute!’ ” (l. 392), he realizes that surmise can have
no voice in fact’s phenomenal domain, and just as sound cannot be glimpsed
in muteness, Browning implies that truth cannot be reached through reason.
Indeed, logical suppositions are bounded within the principle of sufficient reason: they inscribe a circle beyond which they may not venture. By contrast,
Browning shows how fancy lies outside of reason’s bounded circle, encompassing fact. Although the intimations of fancy cannot be logically proven, it has
a vantage of the totality that is beyond the reach of reason: “Thus have we
come back full circle: fancy’s footsteps one by one / Go their round conducting
reason to the point where they begun” (ll. 525–526). Reason arrives at the
place where it began—unable to prove or disprove the fancy’s perception of
the divine, which can only be expressed in the poem by the symbol of music.21
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Browning revisits the correlation between music and fancy in “Flute
Music, with an Accompaniment.”22 Two lovers walking through the forest hear
a flutist playing music in the distance, which elicits a debate between the two
speakers as to the merits of the work. Penelope Gay argues that the two distinct responses to the overheard composition reflect Browning’s empirical view
that what music can express is ultimately circumscribed by subjective interpretation;23 however, this is actually another instance of Browning utilizing the
Romantic distinction between music as idea and music as form to explore the
epistemological faculties of fancy and reason. The man perceives the distant
notes to carry a fresh expression of the eternal, universal emotion of love, declaring that such an experience could not be entirely of this world: “Holds
earth such a wonder? / Fairy-mortal, soul-sense-fusing / Past thought’s power to
sunder!” (ll. 42–44). Representing fancy, he proclaims that rational thought
cannot sunder his imaginative perception of the composition, which intuits in
the notes an expression of the ideal realm. The female speaker, however, maintains the opposite position and asks him to look at the facts. Analyzing the
music for its technical imperfections, she insists that the player is most likely
an amateur musician practicing his notes. Rather than demonstrating the subjectivity of experience, Browning shows that the w
 oman, in perceiving the
composition through her reason, can only consider m
 usic as consisting of form
and not as serving as a vessel for transcendent truth.
Although it is Browning’s conviction that fancy circumvents the princi
ple of sufficient reason to apprehend noumenal truth, it is also his view that its
insights cannot be fully embodied in art, which, in contrast to music, is impli usic
cated in the processes of conceptual thought; therefore, the symbol of m
also becomes an important means through which Browning discusses the idealism of the subjective poet. Indeed, Browning turns to music again and again
in his early poetry to discuss the relationship between idealism, his early idol
Shelley, and the development of his objective poetics. The correlation that
Browning sees between m
 usic and the Romantic poet is unequivocally stated
in his 1851 “Essay on Shelley.”24 Browning defines Shelley as the archetypal
subjective poet who seeks, through his own soul, “Not what man sees, but
what God sees—the Ideas of Plato” (CW, 5: 138). Shelley glimpsed in “the
universe, nature and man, their actual state of perfection in imperfection”
(5: 142), and since he was not willing to accept “the manifold partial developments of beauty and good on every side,” he left “them the ultimates he found
them” (5: 142). It is this interpretation of Shelley’s enduring idealism that leads
Browning to pronounce that Shelley was “moved by and suffused with a m
 usic
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at once of the soul and the sense” (5: 143), where m
 usic symbolizes Shelley’s
acute perception of the existence of ideal forms.
Browning invokes music and its implications for questions of epistemology in his very first published poem, Pauline: The Fragment of a Confession
(1833), to explore his youthful passion for Shelley and his relationship to idealism.25 When the poet-narrator recounts to Pauline his journey from the first
intimations of poetic aspiration to his mature poetic stance, he explains how
Shelley’s idealism set him the task: “To disentangle, gather sense from song: /
Since, song-inwoven, lurked there words which seemed / A key to a new world,
the muttering / Of angels, something yet unguessed by man” (ll. 413–416).
Shelley’s poetry is song—is music—because it speaks of and takes the young
poet to the Platonic ideas that he had begun to perceive through fancy; however, the challenge for the narrator, and for Browning, is to find out whether
he can ultimately realize or “gather sense” from these ideal forms that he follows in Shelley’s bewitching song. Yet upon facing the real world, the narrator
soon realizes that no ideal can ever be fully realized, precipitating his disillusion and despair. Declaring that he will no longer look within, the maturing
poet apprehends the fundamental transition that has taken place in his poetic
philosophy, telling his lover, “I aim not even to catch a tone / Of harmonies he
[Shelley] called profusely up” (ll. 216–217). Nevertheless, he maintains that
Shelley’s song can still be heard: “A melody some wondrous singer sings, /
Which, though it haunt men oft in the still eve, / They dream not to essay; yet
it no less / But more is honoured” (ll. 222–225), demonstrating that rather
than renouncing Shelley, Browning makes his music an abiding symbol
for the noumenal aspect of the world that precedes its imperfect material
manifestation.
Browning continues to use the symbol of music in Paracelsus (1835) to
delineate both Paracelsus’s and the poet Aprile’s failed quests for the absolute
(CW, 1: 64–266). Aprile explains to Paracelsus that his plight has been to love
infinitely and to be loved infinitely in return, and in striving to give form to all
the beauties of nature and passions of humanity, he has endeavored in vain:
“to perfect and consummate all, / Even as a luminous haze links star to star, / I
would supply all chasms with music, breathing / Mysterious motions of the
soul, no way / To be defined save in strange melodies (bk. 2, ll. 475–479).
Although Aprile looks to the forms of the material world, his desire to encompass all of them is akin to the way Paracelsus seeks complete knowledge.
The poet concedes to Paracelsus that he knew that his potential to fully
embody each of the world’s disparate forms was beyond his “mortal power”
(bk. 2, l. 586) and that he should have chosen one and given it “entire / In beauty,
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to the world” (bk. 2, ll. 584–585). Aprile also conceives of Paracelsus’s quest
for the absolute as song: “Sing thou, and I w
 ill sit / Beside, and call deep
silence for thy songs, / And worship thee” (bk. 2, ll. 374–376); furthermore,
when Paracelsus’s dreams of divine knowledge vanish, “they pass in song!”
(bk. 4, l. 189).
The Romantic conception that m
 usic precedes thought is utilized by
Browning in Pauline when the poet-speaker compares the early stirrings of
soul to a bard who first plays m
 usic and then translates t hese intuitions into
the rational realm of words, or the bard’s song: “And first I sang as I in
dream have seen / M
 usic wait on a lyrist for some thought, / Yet singing to
herself u ntil it came” (ll. 377–379). In Sordello, Browning turns again to the
role of the bard who is a musician, as well as a poet who crafts the words of
his songs, to express the problem of realizing fully in the phenomenal world
the intimations of the soul.26 Sordello finds himself “Sundered in twain”
(bk. 2, l. 657) when he discovers that language is not able to express what
the fancy conceives. Browning returns to the symbol of music to express
this dilemma. Sordello wished to capture the harmony of all nature in his
song, but “Meditate / Too long on such a morning’s cluster-chord / And the
whole m
 usic it was framed afford,—/ The chord’s might half discovered,
what should pluck / One string, his finger, was found palsy-struck” (bk. 6, ll.
528–532). In focusing exclusively on the underlying noumenal essence of
the natural world, the harmony of the “cluster-chord,” Sordello has tried to
furnish the m
 usic that frames this totality, and since this is only partially
rendered, he finds that the finger that should have plucked one note at a
time is unable to play at all.
Michael Yetman views Browning’s turn to objective poetry as an exorcism of Shelley’s subjective poetry, but Britta Martens observes how Browning
often looked for an objective poetic that might retain his lyrical ideal.27 However, b ecause Martens views Browning’s definition of the objective poet as
missing the “transcendental component” of the subjective poet, she concludes
that Browning necessarily undermines the pursuit of transcendent truth that
he sees as defining the Romantic project (p. 165). I would argue, however, that
although Browning defines the objective poet in contrast to the subjective
poet as “one whose endeavour has been to reproduce things external,” this
does not exclude Shelley’s idealism because Browning views the objective world
as embodied from the ideal (“Essay on Shelley,” CW, 5: 137).
Browning reveals this conviction explicitly in his explanation that the
“double faculty” of the objective poet sees “external objects more clearly, widely,
and deeply, than is possible to the average mind”—seeing in the object what
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the noumenal substrate originally endeavored to form, but he is also “so acquainted and in sympathy with its narrower comprehension” that he sees the
idea in its necessarily lower forms of material manifestation. This double faculty extends beyond an object as it is empirically presented to perceive both its
ideal content and its empirical form in order to help those people “who would
have missed the deeper meaning and enjoyment of the original object” (“Essay
on Shelley,” CW, 5: 137).
The objective poet must find a fit form to present the object as both
ideal and real, and Browning finds this in the monologue. E. Warwick Slinn
and Loy D. Martin view Browning’s development of the dramatic monologue
as a Victorian response to Romantic epistemology, both considering the monologue as a testament to the poststructural assumption that there is no reality
independent of thought or language.28 As the recent philosophical trend of
speculative realism notes, this “correlationism” in twentieth-century critical
theory, as Quentin Meillassoux terms it, is itself a further articulation of the
Kantian argument that it is impossible to know the thing-in-itself outside of
the a priori forms of perception.29 Browning agrees with Schopenhauer that
the majority of humankind lives within this principle of sufficient reason—a
point that Browning implies in his “Essay on Shelley”; yet both Browning and
Schopenhauer depart from Kant by using Romantic music philosophy to show
that t here are two distinct ways of looking at the object: through reason as a
series of empirical and logical relations or through fancy as the manifested
aspect of the noumenal realm. Browning and Schopenhauer take into account
those aspects of psychology that anticipate critical theory, yet their foundational epistemology allows them to overstep the attendant conclusion that it
undermines the possibility of absolute truth.
In viewing the world through fancy, Schopenhauer declares that “we
 usic as embodied w
 ill” since, like
could just as well call the world embodied m
music, the world embodies the inner essential spirit of e very phenomenon
(pp. 262–263). Carlyle invokes m
 usic to make the same argument in his On
Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History—lectures that Browning attended in 1840—when he exclaims, “The seeing eye! It is this that discloses
the inner harmony of things; what Nature meant, what musical idea Nature
has wrapped up in these often rough embodiments” (p. 67).30 Writing to Joseph Milsand during the composition of Men and Women, Browning explained
that he was attempting “ ‘Lyrics,’ with more music and painting than before, so
as to get people to hear and see.”31 The correlation between music and painting expresses how the monologue for Browning, like humankind itself, is
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embodied music. This means that its objective form comprises both the realms
of will and representation, the ideal and its embodiment in the real. Indeed,
Browning’s speakers are the “rough embodiments,” and the “musical idea” is
not only the germ of truth that Browning sees in every one of his speakers but
also the philosophical idea that each monologue conveys. In presenting these
personas as an object for the “co-operating fancy” of the reader, Browning’s
monologues illuminate what Shaw terms the “astonishing (and often disturbing) life of ideas,” as well as revealing what Browning sees as crucial problems
of epistemology.32
Browning’s music monologues are an important example of how Browning reveals ideas through an existential problem posed by one of his speakers.
Indeed, although Browning’s music monologues, “Abt Vogler” (1864),33 “Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha” (1855; “Men and Women,” CW, 5: 285–292), and
“A Toccata of Galuppi’s” (1855; “Men and W
 omen,” CW, 5: 197–199), have
not been seen to encompass one unified idea about music, in the light of
Browning’s music symbolism, it is apparent that t hese monologues are companion pieces in which Browning uses music to express his foundational
Romantic epistemology. For Browning, music is both numerical form and
ideal content: while reason may only span the temporal structure of music, it
is fancy that perceives music as noumenal expression, and this becomes the
focal point through which Browning explores the ironic tension between
 ogler”),
the ideal and its problematic manifestation in the realms of art (“Abt V
religion (“Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha”), and science (“A Toccata of
Galuppi”).
Since both the speaker of a monologue and the linguistic action of the
monologue itself necessarily belong to the world of representation, Browning
begins “Abt Vogler” with the composition that Vogler builds in his mind, the
external laws of conceptual thought that strive to express internal soul. The
keys of Vogler’s organ are the tools that express sound, and Browning equates
the musician’s process of composition with Solomon’s call for the creatures of
earth, heaven, and hell to build his palace. Just as Browning does in “Charles
Avison,” he uses architectural imagery to show that this is the temporal form
of m
 usic that belongs to conditioned laws of the material world; yet Browning
emphasizes that Vogler’s composition is fashioned out of notes that would have
no intrinsic meaning without his initial divine inspiration, just as Solomon’s
host is also the manifestation of an internal noumenal force: they “rush into sight
at once as he named the ineffable Name” (l. 6). Continuing this imagery of temporal manifestation, Vogler’s notes “build / broad on the roots of t hings, / Then
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swim up again into sight” (ll. 14–15); they are built “fearless of flame, flat on
the nether springs,” (l. 16) and yet his composition at this point in the poem
has failed to express the totality of his initial inspiration.
Vogler knows that notes by themselves are governed by finite rules, and
thus like the other art forms of poetry and painting, it is “art in obedience to
laws” (l. 47); however, Browning shows that the combination of three or more
notes into harmony sparks something altogether more than the sum of its constituent notes, and it is only in this w
 hole that Vogler is able to encapsulate
his initial inspiration: “And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed
to man, / That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star”
(ll. 51–52). Transcending the outer forms of conceptual knowledge—the laws
of cause and effect that govern the arrangement of the individual notes, Vogler’s
music “is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can, / Existent b ehind all
laws, that made them, and, lo, they are!” (ll. 49–50).
Despite the fact that Vogler’s harmonies express his soul, m
 usic is by
nature elusive and transitory. The tension that Vogler feels between his infinite music and its finite embodiment is very similar to the experiences of Wackenroder and Tieck’s fictional musician, Joseph Berlinger, who is torn between
his ecstatic, transcendent flights with m
 usic and the inevitable descent into
 usic is fleeting, Browning uses m
 usic
the material realm.34 However, although m
in “Abt Vogler” as a symbol for the ideal forms that are perceived by feeling
and fancy but cannot be fully expressed in the world of sense. Thus, when
Vogler declares, “Well, it is earth with me” (l. 89), it is not a pessimistic view of
music or a condemnation of the material world, as it is for Berlinger, but rather
a recognition that only in heaven will things exist in their inner essence and
not in their phenomenal form: “All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of
good shall exist; / Not its semblance, but itself” (ll. 73–74).
While Vogler’s m
 usic expresses soul, the church organist who plays the
fictional Master H
 ugues’s fugue in “Master H
 ugues of Saxe-Gotha” cannot get
to the inner truth of H
 ugues’s work: “So your fugue broadens and thickens, /
Greatens and deepens and lengthens, / Till we exclaim—‘But where’s music,
the dickens?’ ” (ll. 96–98). It may initially appear strange to ask for music considering that the speaker is in the process of playing Hugues’s composition, yet
it is explained by the fact that, in looking for the “music” in Master Hugues’s
arrangement, the speaker holds the Romantic view that believes m
 usic can
convey ideal content, rather than an empirical view that sees music to consist
in form. The struggling player imagines Master H
 ugues reprimanding him for
knowing the notes but not understanding the composer’s purpose. However,
the speaker perceives that Hugues’s notion of success is superficially based on
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the technical dexterity that separates him from other players when, in contrast to H
 ugues, the speaker is looking for the inner meaning of the music that
has a significance beyond form.
Browning engages questions of epistemology through this tension between music as form and music as content: since Hugues’s fugue does not reach
beyond its material structure, Browning uses the song’s form as a metaphor for
the epistemological faculty of reason that can only interact with the phenomenal realm.35 While Vogler’s composition embodies music—the expression of
his soul—Browning implies that Master Hugues’s fugue only reflects the futile
intellectualizing of the modern age: “Nothings grow something which quietly
closes / Heaven’s earnest eye: not a glimpse of the far land / Gets through our
comments and glozes” (ll. 118–120). In likening the artificiality of Hugues’s
fugue to the web that people weave in their lives through the intellect or
through reason—“Such a web, simple and subtle, / Weave we on earth here in
impotent strife” (ll. 107–108)—the speaker exclaims that instead of viewing
“God’s gold” (l. 114) or allowing “a glimpse of the far land” (l. 119), Hugues’s
dexterous fugue merely obscures it.36 This has broader philosophical significance for Browning as it reaffirms his personal conviction in La Saisiaz that
religious ideas cannot be known through reason but can only be apprehended
by feeling and fancy.
The toccata is a form that, like the fugue, showcases a player’s technical
dexterity, and Browning shows in “A Toccata of Galuppi’s” that Galuppi’s m
 usic,
in a way similar to Master Hugues’s music, is unable to transcend the material
realm. The speaker of Browning’s monologue is a nineteenth-century scientist, who upon listening to Galuppi’s composition imaginatively projects himself into the world that is embodied in the composer’s music. Although on the
surface there appears to be a discrepancy between what the speaker perceives
as Galuppi’s “stately” (l. 18) and “cold” (l. 33) music and the gay frivolity of the
Venetians, the fact that the progression of Galuppi’s chords mirrors their
 hose lesser thirds so plaintive, sixths diminished, sigh
thoughts—“What? T
on sigh, / Told them something?” (ll. 19–20)—shows that Browning means
Galuppi’s toccata to be an analogue of eighteenth-century Venetian society.
That Galuppi’s toccata is unable to express the ideal is expressed in the poem by
the very fact that it reminds the revelers of their inevitable mortality: “Those
suspensions, those solutions—‘Must we die?’ ” (l. 20). The speaker recognizes
that the Venetians are desperately looking for confirmation of their immortality in Galuppi’s music and that this desire is mirrored in the expected resolution of the toccata: “Hark, the dominant’s persistence till it must be answered
to!” (l. 24).
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That Galuppi’s “octave struck an answer” (l. 25) seems to suggest a musical resolution, and critics have varied in their view as to w
 hether returning to
the tonic is positive or negative in its implications;37 yet I would argue that it
is Galuppi’s inability to answer the Venetians that is the true crux of the poem.
While the Venetians have been seemingly placated by the confirmation that
they find in Galuppi’s music, the speaker recognizes that his toccata only offers a misleading resolution. The key issue h
 ere is that although Galuppi appears to resolve the Venetians’ mortal anxiety by raising the octave in his
toccata, thereby returning to the tonic that provides the resolution, it is crucial to consider that, in the higher octave, Galuppi remains within the same
dominant key; therefore, his elevation to the next octave does not evoke anything different harmonically, or symbolically, for the listener. Constricted by
counterpoint, Galuppi’s toccata is not able to rise above its insistent melodic
structure into a finer expression of harmony that would enable him to reach
truth. It is this hollow sense of elevation that the speaker recognizes when he
cries at the start of the poem, “Oh Galuppi, Baldassaro, this is very sad to find! /
I can hardly misconceive you; it would prove me deaf and blind; / But although
I take your meaning, ’tis with such a heavy mind!” (ll. 1–3). The speaker gives
Galuppi credit for providing an ostensible answer to what the Venetians are
 usic, but he sees that Galuppi is ultimately unable to raise
looking for in his m
them to a perception of the ideal.
The significance of music for matters of epistemology is made clear in
the poem when the speaker, finding a correlation between his own scientific
recourse to reason and Galuppi’s music, begins to doubt the immortality of his
own soul. The scientist imagines Galuppi denouncing the Venetians for their
sensuality and envisions Galuppi comparing the speaker’s scientific pursuits
against such frivolity, yet his comments are clearly ironic in tone toward the
speaker’s achievements: “Yours for instance: you know physics, something of
geology, / Mathematics are your pastime; souls shall rise in their degree; / Butterflies may dread extinction,—you’ll not die, it cannot be!” (ll. 37–39). Schopenhauer argues that knowledge derived from the fields of mathematics and
science belongs to the world of representation since, in evaluating and comparing one representation to another, people fail to perceive the mysterious
inner nature of these phenomena (pp. 96–97). Similarly, Galuppi’s sardonic
praise implicitly connects the speaker’s interest in mathematics and science with
the sensory life of the Venetians to show that he too is unable to glimpse the
ideal. When the speaker laments the transitory nature of life at the end of
the monologue, he is left feeling “chilly and grown old” (l. 45), which reveals
the doubt that he feels about the spiritual efficacy of reason.
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Belonging to the world of representation, Browning’s speakers struggle
in varying ways with apprehending or articulating the nature of the ideal,
and in the m
 usic monologues, m
 usic is a symbol through which Browning
embodies his conviction that the intellect cannot reach religious and scientific truth as it only operates within the principle of sufficient reason.
Browning’s poet-narrator returns to m
 usic in the last lines of The Ring and
the Book to restate this correlation between m
 usic, fancy, and the project of
the objective poet:38
—Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
So you may paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
Deeper then ever Beethoven dived,—
So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside. (bk. 12, ll. 859–867)
In seeking to re-create the external world of representation, the objective poet
“twice show[s] truth” because, in depicting empirical reality, he also points to
the eternal reality that is the source of its phenomenal form—beyond the
“mere imagery on the wall.” Turning to music and to Beethoven, the archetypal Romantic musician, Browning asserts that the objective poet must see
the facts of the material world musically—in other words, with fancy—in
order to perceive their obfuscated meanings. In a series of monologues that
aver the relativity of truth when only looked for within the confines of reason,
it is the role of the objective poet to reveal the relationship between the real
and the ideal. Indeed, in The Ring and the Book, Browning offers a key to
Pompilia’s innocence when Caponsacchi observes how “music seemed / Always to hover just above her lips / Not s ettle,—break a silence m
 usic too”
(bk. 6, ll. 1196–1198). Music philosophy is a central way that Browning conceived of the relationship between the noumenal realm and its imperfect embodiment in the material. If seen through fancy, these phenomenal forms,
while at a remove from what the ideal endeavored to form, are still expressions
of music. This is why Browning asks us again in “The Two Poets of Croisic” to
consider whether “Our simulated thunderclaps / Which tell us counterfeited
truths—these same / Are—sound, when m
 usic storms the soul, perhaps?” (CW,
14: 129–209; 64: ll. 505–507).
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